Abstract-In emerging vehicular communication systems, each vehicle periodically broadcasts safety messages, which contains various vehicle parameters such as location and velocity. While safety messages are designed for advanced road safety and traffic efficiency, a significant concern is that eavesdroppers can track the vehicle's trajectory. In particular, this tracking is easily performed in low vehicle density environments. To address this location privacy issue, we propose a location privacy protection method in such environments using dummy node messages. In our approach, from an eavesdropper's view, the vehicle density is increased by the generation of dummy node messages. Simulation results show that our proposed method reduces tracking probability in high/low vehicle density environments.
I. INTRODUCTION Location privacy preservation is a main issue in Vehicular Communications (VC).
In particular, location tracking probability is considered to be a realistic concern [1] , [2] . Location tracking enables to expose vehicle user's private information, such as the owner's address or favorite spots as well as the vehicle's location or trajectory. In recent years, many approaches have been proposed to prevent location tracking. However, these methods are not effective in low vehicle density environments. In this paper, we tackle the issue of location privacy preservation in high/low vehicle density environments.
A pseudonym provides a fundamental mechanism for location privacy preservation [3] . A pseudonym is a temporal identifier used for communication instead of a real identifier (e.g., MAC address, IP address [4] , [5] ). Vehicles are assigned multiple pseudonyms in advance and communicate with other neighboring vehicles or road side units (RSUs) while frequently changing their pseudo identifiers. The pseudonym mechanism enables the anonymity of the vehicle's real identifier, making location tracking of a specific vehicle more difficult for an adversary. Consequently, location privacy in VC is improved.
However, even if the vehicle's real identifier is anonymized by a pseudonym, the adversary can still track location by estimating the vehicle's trajectory from its property information (e.g., location, velocity, direction) in a communication message. To tackle this problem, various location preservation schemes have been proposed in pseudonym-based environments [6] , [7] , [8] . However, these schemes do not work well in low vehicle density networks (e.g., early-morning or latenight road) because they assume that a certain number of vehicles exist in a specific area.
Although Liu et al. proposed a dummy node generation method to preserve privacy in low vehicle density environments [9] , this method is suitable for location privacy preservation only when a driver uses s location based service (LBS) application. Thus, this method does not assume location tracking using vehicle property information such as location, velocity and direction. Moreover, it does not mention the relationship between node density and location tracking probability.
In this paper, we propose a dummy node message generation method to prevent location tracking geared specifically toward low vehicle density environments. Each vehicle frequently broadcasts dummy node messages that have an invalid pseudo identifier as well as messages that have a valid pseudo identifier. Dummy node messages are not legitimate packets, hence, legitimate members in VC (e.g., vehicles, RSUs) can distinguish these messages from messages with a valid pseudo identifier. In contrast, the adversary cannot distinguish between legitimate and dummy packets, thus, from the adversary's perspective, the node density has increased. Consequently, location tracking becomes more difficult, especially in low density vehicle environments. This method also functions well in high vehicle density environments, because in case of many vehicles, each vehicle only has to decrease the number of dummy node messages. The generation of dummy node messages affects the wireless communication environment of VC. Accordingly, the number of dummy node messages has to be determined considering the tradeoff between the effect of anonymity improvement by increasing the node density and the impact on wireless communication performance. This paper aims to study the effectiveness of our proposed method and the tradeoff noted above.
II. RELATED WORK AMOEBA [6] uses the group concept to improve a vehicle's anonymity. In AMOEBA, a group reader communicates all V2I applications on behalf of the group members. If a given 978-1-4799-0846-2/13/$31.00 c ⃝ 2013 IEEE Fig. 1 . VC system model application is a safety message communication, other group members do not have to broadcast this message, preventing an adversary from tracking their vehicle locations. In addition, the group concept extends the random pseudonym update period. SPCP [10] and CPC [11] are also methods that form a group with neighboring vehicles. Moreover, the simultaneous pseudonym update mechanism is proposed in these methods. REP [12] propose a safety message encryption method using a group symmetric key and group rekeying method. In REP, neighboring vehicles moving in the same direction form a group, then group members encrypt all safety messages with a pre-loaded group symmetric key. A cryptographic mix-zone (CMIX) [7] enables the safety message encryption/decryption in mix-zone. A mix-zone is a specific area in which many vehicles enter and exit temporarily and frequently (e.g., an intersection). All vehicles in a mix-zone have the same symmetric key. They can encrypt or decrypt all safety messages in this zone by using this key. If a safety message is encrypted, an adversary cannot obtain various vehicle parameters from this message; thus, the tracking probability is reduced. Song et al. also define a specific area called a density zone [13] . In a density zone, each vehicle counts the number of other neighboring vehicles, and the vehicles update their pseudonyms only when the average vehicle density in the density zone exceeds a threshold value.
These proposed methods are possible only when a certain number of vehicles exists on a road network . Thus, these methods do not work well on very low vehicle density networks (e.g., early-morning or late-night road). In addition, in such situations, location tracking using a vehicle's property information (e.g., location, velocity, direction) is easier than in a high density situation. Therefore, a location tracking prevention method is required for a low vehicle density environment.
III. VC SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we define the VC system model, communication message in VC, threat model, and tracking algorithm.
A. VC system
The VC system architecture assumed in this paper is shown in Fig. 1 . All vehicles in the VC system periodically broadcast a beacon message that contains their parameters (e.g., location, velocity, acceleration, direction) to other neighboring vehicles and RSUs. All these messages are stored in location servers connected to RSUs through a wired network. The location servers communicate with external application servers on behalf of the vehicles when a vehicle uses VC applications that employ the vehicle's properties. A registration authority (RA) is the trusted authority of a VC system that authenticates vehicles. In VC systems, all vehicles have to register their private information such as license plate number, owner's name and owner's address with the RA. The RA authenticates the vehicle's identifier according to its registration information. Moreover, a pseudonym set is loaded into the vehicle during registration. Most of the proposed methods consider the use of public key infrastructure (PKI) for secure communication [6] , [10] .
We assumed that a pseudonym basically consists of four elements: RA identifier, pseudonym lifetime, public key and digital signature of RA [3] . All nodes that receive a message with a pseudonym can assess the legitimacy of the message by verifying the digital signature in the pseudonym. The on board unit (OBU) is a pre-loaded device in a vehicle and provides wireless communication capability for vehicleto-infrastructure (V2I) and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications. In addition, vehicles are equipped with various sensors and a global positioning system (GPS) device to obtain environmental information such as vehicle's location, velocity, tire pressure, and road surface condition.
B. Safety message
In this study, we assume that each vehicle periodically broadcasts a beacon message, called a safety message as V2I/V2V communication. Safety messages are designed for advanced road safety and traffic efficiency. This messages are used to warn or notify road users of various types of traffic information such as accident locations, the approach of emergency vehicles, and upcoming road surface trouble. In addition, safety message may be used to realize cooperative driving by communicating traffic information to and from neighboring vehicles. The safety message basically contains the source vehicle's traffic information such as location, velocity, acceleration and direction. Moreover, a warning or notification information is added to this message circumstantially. In this paper, the transmission time interval and transmission rules of the assumed safety message are determined by referring to a cooperative awareness message (CAM) [4] as follows:
• transmission time interval: 100 ms to 1000 ms • absolute difference between current direction and last direction > 4
• • difference between current position and last position > 5 m • absolute difference between current velocity and last velocity > 1 m/s These rules are checked by the OBU every 100 ms.
In this paper, we assume that safety messages are not encrypted because they do not contain information closely related personal data [14] . Moreover, computation and communication overhead associated with cryptographic operation has a potential impact on communication performance. On the other hand, it is necessary to authenticate the validity of the safety message sender. This is because if adversaries send safety messages containing false information to misguide other neighboring vehicles, it can adversary affect the traffic environment.
C. Adversary model
We assume a passive adversary that eavesdrops on safety messages in a specific area. This adversary installs multiple radio receivers around a road network in advance, and then eavesdrops on the safety messages that are transmitted by neighboring OBUs. The adversary analyzes these monitored messages and tracks the vehicle trajectory. The tracking probability is increased by having an increased number of receivers.
D. Location Tracking 1) Description:
After collecting safety messages, an adversary attempts to track a target vehicle's location or trajectory by using these messages. The source OBU's ID of safety messages is anonymized using a pseudonym; thus, the adversary needs only the data element of the safety message such as the time it was sent, location, velocity and direction to track the location. The procedure required for location tracking is as follows: i ) Creating the anonymity set : Anonymity set is defined as the set of collected safety messages that contains a target vehicle's messages. A safety message is transmitted during its transmission time interval (e.g., 100 to 1000 ms). Thus, when an adversary receives the safety message of the target vehicle at time t, the anonymity set of the target vehicle consists of all messages monitored in the movable area of the target vehicle during the next transmission time interval. ii ) Determining the target vehicle candidate : An adversary chooses a message from the adversary set and considers it as the candidate of the target vehicle's message. An adversary creates the anonymity set of this candidate message using a method similar to that in Sec. III-D1. An adversary repeats this process and tracks the target vehicle's location or trajectory. The fundamental algorithm of location tracking is shown in Algorithm 1. U pperLimit means upper limit time of a safety message transmission interval. For example, if CAM is used as the safety message, U pperLimit is set to 1000. An adversary estimates the target vehicle's trajectory on the basis of the collected safety messages and information in safety message from the target vehicle's OBU. An adversary finally obtains the message list of that OBU.
2) Determining the target vehicle candidate: Sampigethaya et al. proposed correlation tracking as a method of determining the target vehicle candidate from the anonymity set [6] . Fig. 2 illustrates correlation tracking. This method uses the information in safety messages and estimates the target vehicle candidate from the anonymity set. A message monitored at time t contains l known , speed and direction as the vehicle's AnonymitySet ← M essage 10: end if 11: end for parameters. l known indicates the location contained in this message. Moreover, a certain message i in the anonymity set monitored at t i has a location l i . An adversary uses speed and direction to estimate the vehicle's location l est i for t i − t s after t, and then calculates the distance from l i . This process takes place for all messages in the anonymity set, and thus a certain message i that has the smallest difference between l est i and l i is determined to be the next target vehicle candidate.
IV. DUMMY NODE MESSAGE GENERATION
In this section, we present a location tracking prevention method utilizing dummy node messages. Each vehicle's OBU broadcasts dummy node messages with dummy pseudo identifiers as well as general safety messages with a valid pseudo identifier. Even if the actual node density is low, this method can create a pseudo high vehicle density environment for an adversary. Thus, this method decreases the location tracking probability in a low vehicle density environment. pseudonym. In addition, it transmits dummy node messages to neighboring nodes. The dummy node message also contains the vehicle's parameters such as location and velocity.
A. Description
To provide these mechanisms, the following factors have to be considered.
1) Legitimate members of VC (i.e., neighboring vehicles, RSUs) can distinguish the safety message from a dummy node message using the message identifier. 2) An adversary cannot distinguish between the two messages using the message identifier. 3) An adversary cannot distinguish between the two messages using the unique information contained in these messages. When legitimate members receive the dummy node messages, the message has to be rejected because it does not contain the actual information. By contrast, an adversary should not distinguish between the general safety message and the dummy node message.
To achieve these goals, our proposed method consists of three phases, as described below.
B. Dummy pseudonym set sharing
As discussed in Sec. III-A, every node that received a message with a pseudonym can verify the legitimacy of the pseudonym. Accordingly, a pseudonym that is used as a dummy node message identifier also has to be generated by the RA. Furthermore, a legitimate member needs to determine whether the received message is a dummy node message. A solution to this issue is the sharing of a pseudonym for dummy node messages among legitimate members. The RA generates a pseudonym set for the dummy message's identifier, and then transmits this set to RSUs in the managing region of this RA. Then, when a vehicle enters the radio communication range of the RSU, its OBU receives the pseudonym set from the RSU. Note that the pseudonym set transmitted from the RSU is encrypted with the public key contained in the vehicle's pseudonym. Consequently, all legitimate members that share the same pseudonym set can differentiate between the dummy node message and the safety message. Each pseudonym in a dummy pseudonym set has a given lifetime. If an OBU has an expired pseudonym for a dummy message, that pseudonym is rejected.
C. Dummy movement data passing
In this phase, an RSU generates a dummy movement data for dummy node messages, and then transmits it to a vehicle.
The uniqueness of the information in a dummy node message (e.g., location, velocity) has an effect on the tracking probability. For instance, if an OBU broadcasts fake location information pointing to an inaccessible area, an adversary can easily determine that this message is a dummy node message. Therefore, the dummy node message should contain real information. It is preferable that the dummy node message contains a real vehicle's movement data. To solve this problem, we introduce a movement data passing scheme between the vehicle and RSU. Each RSU has a dummy movement data set that is localized in the area around that RSU in advance. This movement data is generated by making reference to vehicle's past movement patterns. Then, a vehicle receives this data set at the same time as the phase of Sec. IV-B. The OBU chooses movement data from the receiving data set, and then broadcasts a dummy node message that includes this movement data. It therefore becomes difficult for an adversary to detect the dummy node message because the generated message contains real information. The process is described by the following steps.
1) An RSU periodically broadcasts a beacon message and advertises its existence. 
D. Dummy message generation
An OBU broadcasts a dummy node message using a pseudonym for the dummy message and dummy movement data. Each OBU can estimate the approximate number of neighboring vehicles by counting the number of safety messages sent during the safety message transmission interval. If the number of vehicles is small, each OBU generates dummy node messages to bring the node density close to a certain target density. This target density is determined to have a value that enables location tracking prevention considering the traffic environmental characteristics such as the configuration of road network. In contrast, if the node density is high, each OBU decreases the number of dummy node messages that are sent. Moreover, if the node density exceeds the target density, all OBU do not transmit a dummy node message.
Significant number of dummy node messages should be generated by each OBU to prevent location tracking because the effectiveness of location tracking prevention increases with node density. However, the rise in the number of transmitted messages can cause congestion of the wireless communications band, resulting in communication performance degradation. Accordingly, each OBU should minimize the number of dummy node messages sent from the perspective of wireless communication performance. For these reasons, the number of dummy messages needs to be adjusted considering the tradeoff between the effect of anonymity improvement using an increased node density and the impact of wireless communication performance. In our future work, we will propose a scheme that can adjust the number of dummy messages by realizing V2V cooperation between all neighboring vehicles.
V. EVALUATION We performed the simulation of a VC system to evaluate the effect of node density on tracking probability and wireless communication performance.
A. Simulation setup
The simulation parameters are given in Table. I. The road network and real vehicle mobility are created by simulation of urban mobility (SUMO) [15] . We assume that the road network is a 10 × 10 grid network. Moreover, each vehicle moves between two randomly selected intersections on this road network. In this simulation, each vehicle's movement is generated to satisfy a density parameter. This parameter means the average number of vehicles at each intersection. SUMO also generates dummy movement data for dummy node messages. We assume that only one vehicle generates dummy node messages to satisfy a certain target density.
B. Simulation of VC system
We simulate safety message and dummy node message communication, using ns-3 [16] with SUMO mobility data. All messages in this simulation contain four elements as vehicular information: time, location, velocity, direction. In addition, the transmission conditions of these messages follow the foregoing rules in Sec. III-B. An RSU and a radio receiver of the adversary are installed at every intersection. Moreover, each RSU and radio receiver monitors dummy node messages. Location tracking can be done by correlation tracking (described in Sec. III-D2), and then we evaluate location tracking probability. In addition, we compare the performance of tracking prevention between our proposed method and CMIX protocol [7] . CMIX protocol is a basic privacy preservation scheme that provides cryptographic communication function in pseudonym-based environments. If our proposed method shows equivalent effectiveness to CMIX protocol, our method is useful for location tracking prevention. In this simulation, we assume that mixzones are located at each intersection and the range of mixzone is 150 m. The simulation was repeated 10 times. All RSUs provide different dummy movement data and pass them to a vehicle for each simulation. Fig. 4 shows the tracking result for various node density environments. We use a tracking success distance as a metric of location tracking probability. We can see that even if the real node density is low (i.e., the average number of vehicles is from 1 to 5), our proposed method can prevent tracking by generating a lot of dummy node messages (target node density is from 10 to 20). This is because dummy node messages are generated until a target node density and a pseudo high vehicle density environment is created and observed by an adversary. Thus, our proposed method can provide the effect of location tracking prevention in both low and high vehicle density environments.
C. Result
As shown above, the effect of tracking prevention increases with node density. In contrast, the rise in the number of transmitted messages can cause congestion of the wireless communication band, resulting in communication performance degradation. Thus, our proposed method needs to be evaluated from the viewpoint of communication performance. The graph in Fig. 5 demonstrates the bandwidth utilization ratio at a specific intersection for the case that the average number of vehicles is 5. This value is calculated from the number of messages that is monitored by the RSU at each intersection through 6 Mb/s wireless communication. Note that this result represents the average value of the highest ratio for each node density environment. Although the bandwidth utilization ratios monotonously increase in the result, it is considered to be insignificant because these ratios indicate a low value. However, if each OBU generates numerous dummy node messages, these messages cause communication performance degradation. Our proposed method can cope with this problem. Each OBU can estimate the approximate number of current vehicle density by counting the number of safety messages and dummy node messages. Thus, they can adjust the number of dummy node messages. Fig. 6 shows the comparison of between our proposed method and CMIX protocol. We can see that our proposed method is better able to reduce the tracking success distance than CMIX protocol especially in low vehicle density environments (i.e., the average number of vehicles is from 1 to 5). This is because CMIX protocol work well only when a certain number of vehicles exist in the range of mix-zone and our proposed method is designed for location tracking prevention in low vehicle density environments. Moreover, our proposed method can prevent location tracking as well as CMIX protocol in high vehicle density environments.
These results show that our proposed method is effective in high/low vehicle density environments. In a real environment, we assume that high vehicle density environments (e.g., vehicle density is 20) mean urban road. We demonstrated that location tracking is difficult in such environments and our proposed method can minimize the impact on wireless communication performance by decreasing the number of dummy node messages. On the other hand, low vehicle density environments (e.g., the average number of vehicles / intersection = 1) are assumed a country road or early-morning/latenight road. Our proposed method can prevent location tracking in these environments as well as urban road situation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a dummy node generation method that provides location privacy protection regardless of the vehicle density. We performed simulations of wireless communication and location tracking to determine the effect of node density on tracking probability and wireless communication performance. The simulation results confirmed that our proposed method can prevent location tracking in high/low vehicle density environments. In addition, although our method increases the traffic volume, it can minimize the bandwidth utilization ratio. In our future work, we will propose a scheme that can adjust the number of dummy messages by V2V cooperation between all neighboring vehicles.
